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FIRREA-THIRD CIRCUIT JOINS OTHER CIRCUITS IN HOLDING THAT
FIRREA ABOLISHES PREEXISTING CONTRACTS REGARDING CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS
Carteret Savings Bank, FA v. Office of Thrift Supervision (1992)
I. INTRODUCTION
Savings banks, credit unions and savings and loan associations com-
prise what is commonly referred to as the thrift industry. As a result of
the risky and turbulent nature of this industry,2 the federal government
imposes heavy regulations on thrift institutions. 3 In this regulatory ca-
pacity, the federal government may enter into agreements with thrifts.
Under one such agreement, a forbearance agreement, the government
agrees to hold a thrift to certain standards and, in exchange, the thrift
agrees to take a particular action.
4
In 1989, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Re-
1. See generally EDWARD J. KANE, THE S & L INSURANCE MESS: How DID IT
HAPPEN? (1989) (providing detailed discussion of savings and loan crisis).
The thrift industry has two areas of specialty. Id. at 2. The first area of
specialty is raising funds through issuing and servicing financial instruments for
customer accounts. Id. Asset management is the other segment of a thrift's
work. Id. In managing assets, the thrift reinvests customers' funds in high yield
assets. Id. A thrift earns a profit when the interest on these investments exceeds
the interest paid out to customers. Id. at 3.
2. See H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 292-308 (1989), reprinted
in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 88-104 [hereinafter HousE REPORT] (describing unsta-
ble history of thrifts); ANDREW S. CARRON, THE PLIGHT OF THE THRIFT INSTITU-
TIONS 1-26 (1982) (discussing problems of thrift industry such as interest rate
fluctuations and restrictions, insolvency and liquidity issues).
3. See KANE, supra note 1, at 34-37 table 2-3 (listing Acts passed by Congress
between 1932 and 1987 that affected thrift industry); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION, HANDBOOK OF SAVINGS AND LOAN LAW (1953) (discussing history, powers,
operations and regulation of state and federally chartered savings and loans);
Ronald R. Glancz, Thrift Industry Restructured: An Overview of FIRREA, FED. B.
NEWS & J., Dec. 1989, at 472 (discussing regulation of thrift industry).
4. See generally David B. Toscano, Forbearance Agreements: Invalid Contracts for
the Surrender of Sovereignty, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 426, 427-30 (1992) (discussing cre-
ation and effect of forbearance agreements); see also Linda B. Coe, Note, Abroga-
tion of Forbearance Agreements: Unauthorized by FIRREA and Unconstitutional, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 157, 158 (1990) (discussing forbearance agreements between
government and thrift). The basic arrangement can be explained as follows:
In exchange for the [thrift's] acquisition of assets and assumption of
deposit liabilities, the government gave consideration consisting partly
of an agreement that the government would forbear from enforcing
certain regulatory accounting and capital requirements. These forbear-
ance agreements shielded the thrift acquirors from supervisory action
and permitted them to undertake activities normally only allowed for
fully capitalized thrifts.
Coe, Note, supra, at 158.
(1271)
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covery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA),5 a massive piece of legislation
regulating the thrift industry.6 As enacted, some portions of FIRREA
dealing with capital requirements 7 are inconsistent with the terms of
pre-existing forbearance agreements between the government and the
thrifts.8 As a result of this inconsistency, both the government and the
thrifts began questioning whether FIRREA invalidated the terms of the
agreements or whether the pre-existing agreements continue to be
operative. 9
In Carteret Savings Bank, FA v. Office of Thrift Supervision,10 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed the issue of
whether the new capital requirements created by FIRREA applied to
thrifts that had previously entered into forbearance agreements with the
government. I I Although the Third Circuit found that a binding con-
tract existed between the thrift and the government, 12 the court, in ac-
5. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. (1989)).
6. See Glancz, supra note 3, at 472 ("Congress has created a behemoth (the
statute runs 400 to 1,500 pages long... ) that will affect many financial institu-
tions, including thrifts, commercial banks, and the real estate industry.").
7. For a discussion of the new capital requirements imposed by FIRREA,
see notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
8. See Coe, Note, supra note 4, at 158. FIRREA provides minimum capital
requirements for federally insured thrifts. Id. The Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS), the agency in charge of regulating thrifts under FIRREA, "subsequently
declared that this statutory mandate required it to dishonor the government's
obligations to refrain from enforcing certain capital and accounting require-
ments under forbearance agreements." Id. For a more detailed discussion of
forbearance agreements whose terms were subsequently made unlawful by FIR-
REA, see infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
9. See Department of Justice, Billions Riding on Federal Programs Case, DEP'T
JUsT. ALERT, Aug. 1992, at 11 (discussing effect of FIRREA on pre-existing
agreements between thrifts and government regarding capital requirements).
From the thrifts' perspective, "the government's enforcement of [FIRREA]
breached the contracts they entered with the government when they took over
operation and obligations of failed [thrifts]." Id. From the government's per-
spective, however, the thrifts "knew all along the benefits they received from the
government were subordinate to the law of the land, and that they cannot pre-
vent Congress from later changing the rules." Id. For further discussion of
whether the pre-existing agreement or FIRREA prevails in the Third Circuit, see
infra notes 61-98 and accompanying text.
10. 963 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1992).
11. See id. at 573-82 (deciding whether Carteret had contract right to treat
supervisory goodwill as regulatory capital and whether FIRREA abrogated con-
tracts between Carteret and government). The agreements seemingly exempted
the thrifts from FIRREA's capital requirements. See Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v.
Office of Thrift Supervision, 762 F. Supp. 1159, 1170-73 (D.N.J. 1991) (detailing
contents of agreements between government and thrift), vacated, 963 F.2d 567
(3d Cir. 1992). For further detail of the agreements between Carteret and the
government, see infra note 52 and accompanying text.
12. Carteret, 963 F.2d at 573-74. The agreements between Carteret and the
federal regulatory agencies seemingly exempted Carteret from FIRREA's capital
requirements. See id. (finding no real issue concerning existence of binding con-
2
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cordance with three other circuit courts, determined that FIRREA
abolished all agreements not consistent with its terms.' 3 Finally, the
Third Circuit held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the thrift's claim
that, by abrogating the forbearance agreements, the government was
taking the thrift's property without just compensation.' 4
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Thrift Crisis of the 1980s
During the late 1970s and 1980s, savings and loan institutions be-
gan experiencing financial difficulties. First, the thrifts lost money as a
result of holding long-term, low-yield, fixed-rate mortgages at a time
when interest rates were climbing.' 5 The problem rapidly escalated as
the result of several factors.' 6 What began as "financial difficulties" in
the early 1980s subsequently culminated into the failure of many savings
and loan institutions.
17
tracts). For a detailed analysis of the court's finding that contracts existed be-
tween Carteret and the government, see infra note 61-64 and accompanying
text.
13. See Carteret, 963 F.2d at 574-82 (examining statutory language, legisla-
tive history and other circuit courts' opinions and holding that FIRREA super-
sedes prior agreements inconsistent with its terms). For a discussion of the
decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Ninth and Elev-
enth Circuits holding that FIRREA abolished contracts inconsistent with its capi-
tal requirement provisions, see infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the Carteret court's interpretation that FIRREA abolished pre-ex-
isting contracts, see infra notes 65-98 and accompanying text.
14. See Carteret, 963 F.2d at 584 ("We take no position as to whether Car-
teret has a viable takings claim, but hold only that neither the district court nor
[the circuit] court provides the appropriate forum to decide that issue."). For an
examination of the Carteret court's takings claim analysis, see infra notes 99-104
and accompanying text.
15. See Brief for Appellee at 4, Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Office of Thrift
Supervision, 963 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1992) (No. 91-5290) (noting that "record-
high interest rates pushed the cost of funds at thrifts to substantially above the
rate of return on thrift portfolios (which consisted principally of long-term fixed-
rate mortgages)"). One commentator has asserted that the "thrifts were paying
more to attract funds than they were earning on their mortgage portfolios."
Glancz, supra note 3, at 472.
16. Glancz, supra note 3, at 472. In an initial attempt to remedy the prob-
lem, Congress rapidly deregulated the industry, hoping to make it easier for the
thrifts to attract and acquire funds. Id. This period of deregulation, however,
combined with the economic decline in the Southwest and resulted in a signifi-
cant number of thrift failures. Id. Professor Glancz has suggested that several
other factors contributed to the thrift emergency including: "accounting trick-
ery, blind growth, the dismal performance of many thrift managers, lax under-
writing standards, the lack of internal and external controls, radical
deregulation, weak supervision by a number of large states, reliance on 100 per-
cent deposit insurance and outright fraud and insider abuse." Id.
17. See LawrenceJ. White, The S&L Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S57, S57
(1991) (examining savings and loan crisis and, from economic perspective, tell-
ing "the story of what happened, why it happened, how it happened, and what
3
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In response to the increasing number of failures, the government
created an agency to provide various forms of financial assistance to aid
troubled thrifts. 18 This agency's funds were quickly drained, however,
and the agency neared bankruptcy itself as a result of a great number of
thrifts needing financial assistance.1 9
Because the agency was unable to continue assisting the failing
thrifts on its own, the government entered into forbearance agreements
with healthy savings and loan institutions. 20 Under the terms of these
agreements, healthy savings and loan institutions agreed to merge with
failing institutions and to take over the failing institutions' assets and
liabilities. 2 1 Consequently, the healthy institutions were acquiring fail-
ing thrifts whose liabilities greatly exceeded their own assets.2 2 The
healthy institutions wanted consideration in return for accepting this re-
sponsibility. 2 3 Therefore, the government agencies compromised and
permitted any healthy institution that acquired a failing thrift to treat the
must be done so that it never happens again"); Brief for Dollar Bank, FSB as
amicus curiae at 11, Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 963
F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1992) (No. 91-5597, 91-5290) (noting that thrift industry in-
curred losses of $8.8 billion in 1981 and 1982, and that over 80% of all FSLIC
insured thrifts incurred losses between mid-1981 and mid-1982).
18. See 12 U.S.C. § 1729(0(2)(A) (repealed 1989) (authorizing FSLIC to
bail out troubled thrifts by either issuing promissory notes, cash contributions
or guarantees against loss by reason of merger).
19. See 135 CONG. REC. H2703 (daily ed. June 15, 1989) [hereinafter CON-
GRESSIONAL RECORD] (statement of Rep. Hyde) (noting that FSLIC "did not
have the money in its insurance deposit fund to take care of the depositors in
these 100 [failing] institutions"); Brief for Appellee, supra note 15, at 5 (stating
that "[t]he regulators quickly realized that providing tangible assistance at [the
rate the FSLIC was progressing] would bankrupt the insurance fund by April
1982").
20. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, supra note 19, at H2700 (statement of Rep.
Quillen). As Congressman Quillen described the scenario:
Back in the early 1980's, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board went
to some healthy savings and loan institutions throughout the country
and said in effect, "You have a good financial statement, you have good
management, and we need your help. There are some failing savings
and loans in your area. The Federal Government does not have the
insurance funds to bail them out, and we need your help. If you will go
and take over these failing institutions, we will allow goodwill to be am-
ortized over a period of 40 years."
Id.
21. See 12 U.S.C. § 1729(0(1) (repealed 1989) (empowering FSLIC to or-
ganize mergers of financially distressed thrifts with healthy thrifts "in its sole
discretion and upon such terms and conditions as [it] may prescribe").
22. See CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, supra note 19, at H2703 (statement of Rep.
Hyde) (noting that by acquiring failing institutions, healthy thrifts were "getting
half sick themselves").
23. Coe, Note, supra note 4, at 158 ("In exchange for the buyers' acquisi-
tion of assets and assumption of deposit liabilities, the government gave consid-
eration consisting partly of an agreement that the government would forbear
from enforcing certain regulatory accounting and capital requirements.").
4
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acquired thrift's excess liabilities as supervisory goodwill. 24 Treating
the excess liabilities in this manner enabled these healthy thrifts to in-
clude goodwill as part of their risk-based capital and to amortize the
goodwill over a period of forty years. 25 Although this practice tempo-
rarily alleviated the government's funding problems, savings and loan
institutions continued to fail during the 1980s. 26 As a result, Congress
subsequently made numerous statutory attempts to remedy the
situation.
2 7
B. Enactment of FIRREA and its Effect
In 1989, shortly after the Bush administration came into office,
President Bush presented Congress with a plan to resolve the savings
and loan crisis.2 8 Congress enacted this plan, known as the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIR-
REA). 29 The major purposes of FIRREA were to properly allocate
funding for failed thrifts, to distinguish between the regulatory and in-
surance roles of the thrift industry, to strengthen capital standards for
thrifts and to protect against insider abuse by reinforcing regulatory
powers.30
FIRREA made many changes to both the substance and the form of
savings and loan regulation.3 ' One notable change was the imposition
24. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 497-98, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
292-93. "Supervisory goodwill represents the difference between the value of
the assets and liabilities of the failed institutions." Id. at 497, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 293; see Toscano, supra note 4, at 426 (noting that supervisory
goodwill is "an intangible asset that when included in capital does not provide a
genuine cushion against losses").
25. See HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 497-98, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 292-93. "Supervisory goodwill is not carried as a permanent
asset. It is amortized, or written off over a specified period. Every year savings
and loans with supervisory goodwill expense a portion of it. To cover this ex-
pense, an institution must earn a profit on its other assets." Id. at 498, reprinted
in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 293.
26. See Stuart M. Gerson, Goodwill and Net Worth Maintenance Actions, 588
PRAC. L. INST. 287 (1991) ("[M]any thrifts ... used their expanded powers and
inflated capital in ways that perpetuated the crisis.").
27. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 294-96, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 90-92 (discussing 1978 Financial Institutions Regulatory and
Interest Rate Control Act (FIRICA), Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMC) and other regulatory actions).
28. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 88.
29. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. (1989)).
30. Glancz, supra note 3, at 472.
31. Seegenerally 12 U.S.C. §§ 1422a-1468c (Supp. 1991). FIRREA replaced
the Bank Board with the Federal Housing Finance Board for matters concerning
the Federal Home Loan Banks. Id. § 1422a. The statute also created the Office
of Thrift Supervision (OTS), which was to "be an office in the Department of the
Treasury." Id. § 1462a. OTS took over the duties of the Bank Board and the
FSLIC in regulating and examining thrifts. Id. §§ 1462a-1467c (defining duties
1993] 1275
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of new capital requirements on thrifts.3 2 These new capital require-
ments severely restricted the use of supervisory goodwill as regulatory
capital.
3 3
After Congress enacted FIRREA, questions arose concerning the
restrictions on the use of supervisory goodwill. Some thrifts held for-
bearance agreements with the government that allowed them to use su-
of OTS). In addition, the statute established the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC), which "assume[d] all rights and obligations of the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation." Id. § 1441a(h)(1). The RTC is in charge of
merging or liquidating thrifts placed into receivership or conservatorship after
1988 and before 1993. Id. § 1441a(b)(l)(A) & (3).
Substantively, FIRREA also made many changes. Savings deposits are no
longer insured by the FSLIC but by the Savings Association Insurance Fund
(SAIF), which the FDIC administers. Id. § 1815. In addition, the thrifts have
investment restrictions, housing related investment requirements, limited loan-
ing powers, accounting and capital requirements, and acquisition authorization.
Glancz, supra note 3, at 472. Finally, the statute expanded civil and criminal
penalties. Id.
For a more detailed analysis of FIRREA's provisions and of how FIRREA
changed the structure of the thrift industry, see Michael P. Malloy, Nothing to Fear
but FIRREA Itself. Revising and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Reg-
ulation, 50 OHIo ST. L.J. 1117 (1989). For a general discussion of FIRREA that
concentrates on the RTC, which manages and resolves thrifts that have been
placed in conservatorship or receivership, see Patti G. Meire et al., The RTC: A
Practical Guide to the Receivership/Conservatorship Process and the Resolution of Failed
Thrifts, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1990).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(1) (noting that Director may set "uniformly appli-
cable capital standards ...[including] a leverage limit; . . .a tangible capital
requirement; and ...a risk-based capital requirement"); see Alex M. Azar II,
Note, FIRREA: Controlling Savings and Loan Association Credit Risk through Capital
Standards and Asset Restrictions, 100 YALE LJ. 149, 151-54 (1990) (discussing three
types of risks encountered by thrifts-credit risk, interest rate risk and liquidity
risk-and FIRREA's means of controlling these risks through capital require-
ments and asset restrictions).
33. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(3) (describing limits on use of supervisory
goodwill). In general, "an eligible savings association may include qualifying
supervisory goodwill in calculating core capital." Id. A savings association is
"eligible" if the Director of OTS determines that the association: (1) has com-
petent management; (2) has substantially complied with all applicable regula-
tions; and (3) has not engaged in fraudulent or speculative practices. Id.
FIRREA defines qualifying supervisory goodwill as "supervisory goodwill ex-
isting on April 12, 1989, amortized on a straightline basis over the shorter of...
20 years, or ...the remaining period for amortization in effect on April 12,
1989." Id. § 1464(t)(9)(B). "Core capital," for purposes of FIRREA, is the
amount of "core capital as defined ... for national banks, less any unidentifiable
intangible assets, plus any purchased mortgage servicing rights excluded from
... definition of capital [for banks] but included in calculating the core capital of
savings associations ...." Id. § 1464(t)(9)(A).
The amount of qualifying supervisory goodwill may not, however, exceed
the applicable percentage of total assets set forth in tabular form in the statute.
Id. § 1464(t)(3). The table essentially allows thrifts to include supervisory good-
will in core capital in an amount equal to 1.5% of total assets acquired before
January 1, 1992. Id. For assets acquired afterJanuary 1, 1992, the table gradu-
ally phases out the allowable amount until 1995, when no supervisory goodwill
may be included in core capital. Id.
6
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pervisory goodwill in a manner that was contrary to FIRREA's
directive. 3 4 Therefore, an issue arose as to whether FIRREA applied
only prospectively or whether FIRREA affected the existing forbearance
agreements. The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) issued a bulletin
addressing this issue stating that FIRREA abrogated these prior con-
tracts. 35 Suddenly, thrifts that the government, the public and investors




The OTS bulletin stating that FIRREA's capital requirements ap-
plied to all thrifts, regardless of agreements to the contrary, caused a
great deal of disturbance in the thrift industry.3 7 The bulletin had a
marked effect on thrifts that had entered into what they believed were
binding contracts allowing them to include supervisory goodwill in their
regulatory capital and to amortize it over a long period.3 8 Conse-
quently, many of these thrifts brought suit in federal court to clarify FIR-
REA's effect on these purported contracts.3 9 The thrifts based their
claims for relief on two alternative theories: (1) FIRREA did not abro-
gate binding forbearance agreements; and (2) if FIRREA did abrogate
these contracts, such abrogation constituted a taking by the government
34. For a discussion of forbearance agreements in the context of supervi-
sory goodwill, see supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
35. See OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, CAPITAL ADEQUACY: GUIDANCE ON
THE STATUS OF CAPITAL AND ACCOUNTING FORBEARANCES AND CAPITAL INSTRU-
MENTS HELD BY A DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND, THRIFT BULLETIN No. 38-2 (Jan. 9,
1990) [hereinafter OTS THRIFT BULLETIN].
36. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 27, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
410 (stating that "[m]any of these institutions [were] the financially healthy por-
tion of this industry-making profits and paying dividends, [but] [o]vernight, as
the accounting standards [were] re-legislated, they [became] 'unsafe and un-
sound' for the purposes of federal banking law").
37. See Gerson, supra note 26, at 287 ("FIRREA's enhanced capital require-
ments led to an outpouring of litigation from thrifts which, without supervisory
goodwill, were unable to meet FIRREA's stricter capital requirements.").
38. For a discussion of the effect of FIRREA's capital requirements on
thrifts that entered into forbearance agreements with the government, see infra
notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
39. See Charter Fed. Say. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 773
F. Supp. 809, 826-27 (W.D. Va. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 976 F.2d 203,
214 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1643 (1993); Hansen Say. Bank v.
Office of Thrift Supervision, 758 F. Supp. 240, 247 (D.N.J. 1991); Security Fed.
Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 747 F. Supp. 656, 660 (N.D.
Fla. 1990); Guaranty Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision,
742 F. Supp. 1159, 1163 (M.D. Ga. 1990), rev'd, 928 F.2d 994, 1006 (11th Cir.
1991); Far W. Fed. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 738 F. Supp.
1559, 1571 (D. Or. 1990); Franklin Fed. Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift
Supervision, No. CIV-2-90-166, 1990 WL 123145, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. July 16,
1990), rev'd, 927 F.2d 1332, 1334 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 370 (1991).
12771993]
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and required just compensation. 40
Nearly all the district courts that decided these issues provided eq-
uitable relief for the thrifts.4 1 As a threshold issue, many district courts
found that a binding contract existed between the thrift and the govern-
ment agency. 42 In providing relief for the thrifts, these courts held that
40. See Charter Fed. Say. Bank, 773 F. Supp. at 826-27 (bringing claim that
FIRREA did not abrogate contracts and, alternatively, that such abrogation con-
stituted taking); Hansen Say. Bank, 758 F. Supp. at 247 (same); Security Fed. Say.
Bank, 747 F. Supp. at 660 (same); Guaranty Fin. Servs., 742 F. Supp. at 1163
(same); Far W. Fed. Bank, 738 F. Supp. at 1571 (same); Franklin Fed. Say. Bank,
1990 WL 123145, at *1 (same).
41. See Charter Fed. Say. Bank, 773 F. Supp. at 827 (declaring that contract
existed and allowing rescission of contract if thrift was substantially burdened by
OTS enforcement action); Hansen Say. Bank, 758 F. Supp. at 247 (preliminarily
enjoining OTS from "declaring [thrift's] ... current noncompliance ... unsafe
or unsound" and excluding thrift's "supervisory goodwill . . . from its capital
calculations for all regulatory purposes"); Security Fed. Say. Bank, 747 F. Supp. at
660 (enjoining OTS "from enforcing against the [thrift] any regulatory capital
requirements inconsistent with the [forbearance agreement]"); Guaranty Fin.
Servs., 742 F. Supp. at 1163 (preliminarily enjoining OTS "from excluding the
amortization of supervisory goodwill from any and all determinations of the
[thrift's] capitalization as set out in the forbearance agreement"); Far W. Fed.
Bank, 738 F. Supp. at 1571 (preliminarily enjoining OTS from "imposing or
enforcing any regulatory restrictions against [thrift] that are inconsistent with
the express terms of [forbearance agreement]"); Franklin Fed, Say. Bank, No.
CIV-2-90-166, 1990 WL 123145, at *1 (permanently enjoining OTS from "ex-
cluding the amortization of supervisory goodwill from any and all determina-
tions of the [thrift's] capitalization as set out in the [forbearance agreement]").
But see Northeast Sav., FA v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 770 F. Supp.
19, 25 (D.D.C. 1991) (granting OTS's motion to dismiss and denying thrift's
motion for preliminary injunction); Transohio Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of
Thrift Supervision, No. CIV.A.90-1678, 1991 WL 201178, at *10 (D.D.C. Aug.
1, 1991), aff'd, 967 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (denying motion for preliminary
injunction); Flagship Fed. Say. Bank v. Wall, 748 F. Supp. 742, 749 (S.D. Cal.
1990) (granting no injunctive relief because there was "no irreparable harm, and
[because] the [thrift was] not likely to succeed in showing that FIRREA prohib-
ited the actions of the OTS or FDIC, or that there was a breach of contract");
Century Fed. Sav. Bank v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 1363, 1370 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (denying motion for preliminary injunction).
42. See Charter Fed. Say. Bank, 773 F. Supp. at 821-22 (finding contract based
on existence of consideration and mutual promises between OTS and thrift);
Hansen Say. Bank, 758 F. Supp. at 244-47 (finding contractual forbearances
based on documentary evidence and oral testimony of parties' intent); Franklin
Fed. Say. Bank, 1990 WL 123145, at *1 (finding that forbearance agreement was
"an integral part of the entire agreement and was for the benefit of all parties in
order to recapitalize the failing institution and to prevent additional agency and
taxpayer expenditures which would have been necessitated by a failure of the
institution"); Security Fed. Say. Bank, 747 F. Supp. at 658 (stating that evidence
"strongly indicat[ed] . . . that [thrift] bargained for, and received, a promise
from the government that its unamortized deferred loan losses would be treated
as a component of its regulatory capital"); Guaranty Fin. Sers., 742 F. Supp. at
1162 (not expressly finding existence of contract but basing holding on this
fact); Far W. Fed. Bank, 738 F. Supp. at 1564 (existence of contract inherent in
holding). But see Century Fed. Say. Bank, 745 F. Supp. at 1370 (finding that thrift
was subject to subsequent congressional action under FIRREA because agree-
8
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the savings provision in FIRREA preserved the binding contracts. 43 On
appeal, however, all circuit courts that heard the claims reversed the dis-
trict courts' decisions.4 4 The circuit courts found that the savings provi-
sion did not apply to the agreements between the thrifts and the
government.4 5 In addition, the circuit courts either rejected the taking
claims asserted under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution or found that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction over the
claims.
4 6
III. CARTERET SAVINGS BANK, FA v. OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION
A. Introduction
Carteret Savings Bank (Carteret), one of New Jersey's largest sav-
ment "did not contain a forbearance or waiver of existing regulations" as in
other cases).
43. See Hansen Sav. Bank, 758 F. Supp. at 246 (finding that § 401 "pre-
serve[s] contractual forbearances of capital standards even though section 301
states that the new capital standards apply to all thrifts"); Security Fed. Sav. Bank,
747 F. Supp. at 658-59 (same); Guaranty Fin. Serv., 742 F. Supp. at 1162 (same);
Far W. Fed. Bank, 738 F. Supp. at 1562-64 (same); Franklin Fed. Say. Bank, 1990
WL 123145, at *1 (same). But see Flagship Fed. Say. Bank, 748 F. Supp. at 748
(rejecting applicability of § 401 because that section "prevents any change in
agency obligations as a result of the abolition of the [Bank Board] and the
FSLIC" not as a result of controversy at issue); Transohio Sav. Bank, 1991 WL
201178, at *8 (finding statute ambiguous and deferring to OTS's interpretation
that § 401 does not preserve forbearances at issue).
44. See Far W. Fed. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 951 F.2d
1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1991) (reversing district court and remanding to vacate
judgment); Guaranty Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision,
928 F.2d 994, 1006 (11 th Cir. 1991) (reversing and remanding with instructions
to dissolve preliminary injunction); Franklin Fed. Say. Bank v. Director, Office of
Thrift Supervision, 927 F.2d 1332, 1339, 1341 (6th Cir.) (reversing district
court), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 370 (1991).
45. See Far W. Fed. Bank, 951 F.2d at 1098 (holding that language of § 401,
structure of statute and legislative history support notion that § 401 does not
preserve forbearance agreements); Guaranty Fin. Servs., 928 F.2d at 1006 (stating
that "FIRREA would abrogate supervisory goodwill forbearances" and holding
that § 401(g) did not apply to treatment of supervisory goodwill); Franklin Fed.
Say. Bank, 927 F.2d at 1339 (examining language of statute as well as legislative
history and holding that § 402(g) does not preserve forbearance agreements).
In many of the cases in which the circuit courts found that the savings provi-
sion did not apply to forbearance agreements, the courts did not address the
preliminary issue of whether a binding contract existed. See, e.g., Far W Fed.
Bank, 951 F.2d at 1097-1100 (deciding case without discussing issue of existence
of contract); Franklin Fed. Say. Bank, 927 F.2d at 1339 (same). But see Guaranty
Fin. Servs., 928 F.2d at 1001 (recognizing that contract existed but interpreting
contract to mean that thrift "had the right to treat its goodwill as regulatory
capital and amortize it over a twenty-five year period for so long as the statutes
and regulations governing the area remained as they were when the agreement
was signed").
46. See Far W. Fed. Bank, 951 F.2d at 1100 (holding that court had no juris-
diction to hear taking claim); Franklin Fed. Say. Bank, 927 F.2d at 1341 (same); see
also Guaranty Fin. Servs., 928 F.2d at 1006 (failing to address taking issue).
9
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ings and loan institutions, engaged in several business transactions dur-
ing the 1980s.4 7 The first of these transactions took place in 1982 when
Carteret acquired two failing thrifts.48 In 1986, Carteret merged with
three additional savings associations, two of which had financial difficul-
ties.49 Upon each acquisition, Carteret accepted full responsibility for
all financial difficulties accompanying the thrift.50 Carteret, like many
other healthy institutions, attempted to utilize its financial responsibility
for the acquired thrift in a manner that would not be detrimental to its
own financial well-being. 5' Therefore, Carteret entered into several
agreements with government regulatory agencies at the time of the thrift
acquisitions to ensure that it would achieve this goal.
52
47. Carteret Say. Bank, FA v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 963 F.2d 567,
569 (3d Cir. 1992). At trial, both parties acknowledged that Carteret suffered
losses in 1981 and 1982 as a result of engaging in "long-term, low yielding fixed
rate mortgag[ing] while their cost of funds sharply increased as a result of record
inflation." Id. In 1982, Carteret converted to a federally chartered mutual asso-
ciation and in 1983 to a federally chartered stock association. Carteret Sav.
Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 762 F. Supp. 1159, 1162 (D.N.J. 1991),
vacated, 963 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1992). By 1991, AmBase Corporation, a publicly
traded corporation, owned Carteret. Id.
48. Carteret, 963 F.2d at 569. In 1982, Carteret acquired First Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Association located in Delray Beach, Florida (Delray) and Barton
Savings and Loan Association located in Newark, New Jersey (Barton). Id.
49. Id. at 571. Although Carteret acquired three thrifts, only the two trou-
bled thrifts are pertinent to the case: First Federal Savings and Loan Association
of Montgomery County, Blacksburg, Virginia (First Federal) and Mountain Se-
curity Savings Bank, Wytheville, Virginia (Mountain Security). Id.
50. Id. at 569-70. All parties to the action agreed that both Barton and
Delray had liabilities in excess of their assets. Id. at 569. Barton's liabilities ex-
ceeded its assets by $46 million, and Delray's liabilities exceeded its assets by
$168 million. Id. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC) assisted Carteret in the Barton acquisition by giving Carteret $11.7 mil-
lion. Id. The 1986 acquisitions also generated liabilities in excess of assets ap-
proximating $22 million. Id. at 571.
51. Id. at 569-70. Carteret wanted to treat the acquired thrifts' excess liabil-
ities as supervisory goodwill and to amortize a portion of this goodwill in calcu-
lating regulatory capital at the end of each year. Id. (noting that statutes and
regulations govern amount of regulatory capital that financial institutions must
maintain). Because Carteret's acquisitions generated approximately $214 mil-
lion of liabilities in excess of assets, including supervisory goodwill in calculating
capital requirements was extremely important to Carteret, particularly because
this amount "far exceeded Carteret's own net worth prior to the acquisitions."
Id. Carteret wished to amortize the supervisory goodwill generated by the 1982
acquisitions over a period of 40 years. Id. The Bank Board and the FSLIC must
each approve arrangements such as the merger between Carteret and the failing
thrifts. Id. If the Bank Board and the FSLIC did not approve Carteret's plan,
Carteret intended to request that the FSLIC compensate Carteret for the differ-
ence in earnings caused by this failure. Id. With respect to the 1986 acquisition,
Carteret wished to amortize the amounts over only a 25 year period. Id. at 571.
52. Id. at 570. The 1982 acquisitions resulted in a Merger Resolution in
which the Bank Board accepted Carteret's suggested procedures. Id. The
Merger Resolution contained several forbearance clauses, one of which is signifi-
cant to this case:
Provided that Carteret submits to the Bank Board ... certification ...
1280
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In 1989, several years after Carteret's acquisitions,. Congress en-
acted FIRREA. 53 When OTS examined and calculated Carteret's capital
in 1990, OTS did not include the supervisory goodwill that Carteret ob-
tained during the 1982 and 1986 acquisitions. 54 As a result, Carteret
failed to meet FIRREA's risk-based capital requirements.
55
Carteret subsequently filed a complaint against OTS in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief.56 As a preliminary matter, the district court
that Carteret has accounted for the assets and liabilities acquired in the
Mergers, and the resulting periods for the amortization of goodwill and
the accretion of the loan discount, in accordance with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles ("GAAP"), as GAAP existed at the time of
the Bank Board's approval of the Mergers, such certification shall be
considered to be satisfactory evidence that Carteret's use of the
purchase method of accounting is in accordance with GAAP, and such
use of the purchase method of accounting will be considered to be in
accordance with regulatory accounting procedures.
Id. The Bank Board and the FSLIC also "expressly reserve[d] all of their statu-
tory rights and privileges with respect to Carteret." Id. The Bank Board ex-
plained this phrase as meaning that the Bank Board and FSLIC reserved only
those rights that it did not expressly waive in the forbearance agreement. Id. at
571. Carteret also entered into an Assistance Agreement with the FSLIC that
"bound the parties' " successors, and contained an integration clause that com-
bined any letters or decisions (made by the regulators) with the agreement as
long as they did not conflict. Id. at 570. Carteret did not insist on a forbearance
agreement for the 1986 acquisition, but only requested that the Bank Board ap-
prove Carteret's use of supervisory goodwill and amortization of the goodwill.
Id.
53. For a thorough discussion of FIRREA, see supra notes 28-33 and ac-
companying text.
54. Carteret, 963 F.2d at 571.
55. Id. The OTS Assistant Director sent Carteret a "Stipulation and Con-
sent to the Issuance of a Capital Directive" and instructed Carteret to employ it
within 24 days. Id. This plan required Carteret to take steps to bring its regula-
tory capital into compliance with FIRREA. Id.
56. Carteret Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 762 F. Supp. 1159,
1165 (D.N.J. 1991), vacated, 963 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1992). Carteret named OTS
and the FDIC as defendants. Id. Although the district court held that the FDIC
was a proper defendant, the court found that any claim Carteret had against the
FDIC was not ripe. Id. at 1166-67.
Carteret's original complaint contained seven counts: (1) the defendant ex-
ceeded its statutory authority under FIRREA when it failed to consider supervi-
sory goodwill; (2) the defendant violated the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA); (3) the plaintiff seeks a declaration that FIRREA does not, and cannot,
abrogate alleged contracts between the plaintiff's and defendant's predecessors;
(4) the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs reliance thereon estops defendant
from disregarding supervisory goodwill; (5) the right to use the goodwill is
property protected by the Fifth Amendment and the defendant's refusal to con-
sider it is a taking requiring due process of the law; (6) the plaintiff is entitled to
reformation of the contract to give plaintiff the cash it is entitled to as considera-
tion under the contract between the parties; and (7) the defendant breached its
contract with the plaintiff. Id. at 1165. Carteret also sought a temporary re-
straining order to prevent OTS from taking action against Carteret for being
undercapitalized, which the district court granted. Id.
11
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found that it had jurisdiction to hear Carteret's claims. 57 The district
court granted Carteret's motion for a preliminary injunction and or-
dered OTS to include supervisory goodwill in calculating Carteret's cap-
ital.5 8 OTS appealed the district court's order to the United States
57. Id. at 1165-68. The district court reaffirmed the bases of its jurisdiction
that it had previously announced in oral opinion. Id. at 1166. These bases for
jurisdiction included the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and FIRREA,
which waives sovereign immunity. Id. at 1167; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (1988)
(right of review under APA); 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1) (Supp. 1991) (providing
that Director of OTS is subject to suit under FIRREA). Supplementing its origi-
nal oral opinion, the court also found that it had jurisdiction over Carteret's
takings claim. Carteret, 762 F. Supp. at 1167-68. The court noted that the fed-
eral courts have disagreed on whether a district court or a circuit court has juris-
diction to hear a takings claim under FIRREA. Id. The court rejected OTS's
argument that Carteret could only bring its claim in the claims court pursuant to
the Tucker Act. Id. at 1168; see 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988) (giving claims court
jurisdiction over claims against United States). The district court found that be-
cause Carteret brought its claim against OTS and FDIC, not the United States,
and sought injunctive relief, not money damages, the Tucker Act did not pro-
vide exclusive jurisdiction. Id.
58. Carteret, 762 F. Supp. at 1182. The district court first discussed the four
factors governing the grant of a preliminary injunction:
(1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success
on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by the
denial of such relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result
in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting
preliminary relief will be in the public interest.
Id. at 1168-69. The court ultimately found that each one of these elements was
satisfied. Id. at 1169-82.
In determining whether Carteret met the first element, the district court
addressed two major issues. Id. at 1169. The first issue was whether Carteret
had entered into binding contracts with FSLIC and the Bank Board and whether
FIRREA abrogated these contracts. Id. at 1169-78. Dissecting the agreements
between Carteret and the FSLIC and Bank Board and applying principles of
state and federal contract law, the district court found that binding agreements
existed between the parties. Id. at 1169-73. In deciding whether FIRREA abro-
gated these contracts, the district court found that the language and legislative
history of the statute was ambiguous. Id. at 1173-78. The district court ex-
amined, therefore, whether OTS's interpretation of the statute was reasonable.
Id. at 1176-78. The district court concluded that interpreting FIRREA as in-
tending to abrogate pre-existing contracts was not reasonable. Id. As a result,
the district court found that there was a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits of Carteret's contracts claim. Id. at 1178.
The second issue was whether an abrogation of this sort was a taking under
the Fifth Amendment, which required the government to provide just compen-
sation. Id. at 1178-81. The district court first determined that it had jurisdiction
to hear a takings claim. Id. at 1179-80. Because monetary relief under the
Tucker Act in the United States Claims Court would not adequately compensate
Carteret, the district court found that it could properly entertain a claim for in-
junctive relief. Id. The district court next considered the likelihood that Car-
teret would be successful in its takings claim and the court found that the
"economic impact of the governmental action and its interference with invest-
ment-backed expectations [were] extreme." Id. at 1180-81. The district court
concluded that Carteret would probably be successful in proving a takings claim
if the case were tried on the merits. Id.
The district court also concluded that Carteret successfully met the final
12
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.5 9 On appeal, the three issues of
first impression before the court in Carteret Savings Bank, FA v. Office of
Thrift Supervision were (1) whether a contractual right to treat supervisory
goodwill as capital arose out of the agreements between the thrift and
the government; (2) whether FIRREA abrogated such contracts; and (3)
whether abrogation of such contracts constituted a taking under the
Fifth Amendment that the district court could enjoin.
60 '
three elements for preliminary injunction. Id. at 1181-82. First, the court found
that Carteret would suffer irreparable harm in three ways: Carteret would be
subject to sanctions for noncompliance solely because it could not include the
supervisory goodwill in capital; Carteret's reputation would suffer greatly; and
Carteret would be restrained from expanding its assets. Id. at 1181. In addition,
the court, decided that the government would not suffer additional harm if the
injunction were granted. Id. at 1182. The government would only be harmed,
the court reasoned, if Carteret was likely to fail in the near future, because this
was the government's sole concern in enforcing FIRREA. Id. Finally, the court
concluded that the public would be protected because the injunction would pre-
vent Carteret from sustaining injury. Id.
Accordingly, the district court granted Carteret's request for a preliminary
injunction. Id. The April 12, 1991 preliminary injunction prevented OTS from
"taking any action against plaintiff, either directly or indirectly, by reason of de-
fendants' failure to count as capital the total amount of supervisory goodwill
recorded by plaintiff (amortized in accordance with plaintiffs agreements with
defendants) for all supervisory and regulatory capital determinations and pur-
poses." Carteret Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 963 F.2d 567, 572
(3d Cir. 1992) (quoting trial court appendix).
59. Carteret, 963 F.2d at 567. OTS and its director brought two appeals that
were consolidated in this action. Id. at 572. One appeal challenged the prelimi-
nary injunction and the other challenged the district court's calculation of the
amount of Carteret's supervisory goodwill. Id. OTS challenged the district
court's calculation because the district court included amounts of goodwill from
banks that Carteret subsequently sold. Id. Although the FDIC was also a de-
fendant in the action, the FDIC did not appeal the decision because the district
court did not include the FDIC in the preliminary injunction. Id. at 572 n.l.
60. Id. at 573. Before addressing these three issues, the Third Circuit first
determined whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Id. at 572-73. The
court found it had jurisdiction over the appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1) (1988). Carteret, 963 F.2d at 572-73. The court next determined
whether the issues presented in the case were moot because a real legal contro-
versy no longer existed., Id. The Third Circuit questioned whether a real legal
controversy still existed as a result of the following sequence of events. Id. After
the district court issued the preliminary injunction, Carteret submitted a plan to
OTS describing its capital situation. Id. at 573. Carteret then consented to al-
low OTS to take action against it for being undercapitalized. Id. The subject of
the preliminary injunction, however, was to prevent OTS from taking such action.
Id.
The court stated that a case would be moot unless it involved: "(1) a legal
controversy that is real and not hypothetical, (2) a legal controversy that affects
an individual in a concrete manner so as to provide the factual predicate for
reasoned adjudication, and (3) a legal controversy with sufficiently adverse par-
ties so as to sharpen the issues for judicial resolution." Id. at 573 (quoting Inter-
national Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Kelly, 815 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir.
1987)). The court was concerned only that Carteret's situation failed to satisfy
the first and second elements. Id.
While OTS conceded that Carteret no longer suffered irreparable injury be-
13
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B. Case Analysis
1. Effect of FIRREA on Existing Contracts
In Carteret, the Third Circuit first considered whether the agree-
ments between the government and Carteret created a contractual right
to treat supervisory goodwill as capital. 6 1 In examining this issue, the
Third Circuit first stated that it was assuming that both the 1982 and
1986 transactions had produced binding contracts between the Bank
Board and Carteret. 62 The terms of these contracts allowed Carteret to
include supervisory goodwill "dollar for dollar" in its regulatory capital
and to amortize the supervisory goodwill over a period of years. 6 3 The
court qualified this assumption, however, by noting that the mere exist-
ence of a binding contract between Carteret and the government did not
limit or terminate the government's right to change minimum capital
requirements.
64
The essence of each party's claim, therefore, centered around the
effect of FIRREA on the 1982 and 1986 contracts between Carteret and
cause it submitted a Capital Plan and consented to issuance of a Capital Direc-
tive, OTS still contended that the issue of whether supervisory goodwill should
be included in Carteret's regulatory capital was not moot. Id. The issue was not
moot, OTS asserted, because Carteret's regulatory capital not only limited the
amount of loans a bank could make, but also governed the volume of transac-
tions into which the bank could enter with its affiliates and subsidiaries. Id. (cit-
ing 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(u), 1468 (Supp. 1991) and 56 Fed. Reg. 34,005, 34,008
(1991) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 563)). The Third Circuit rejected OTS's
arguments as "merely speculative," finding Carteret's arguments more persua-
sive. Id. at 573. Carteret argued that because it had voluntarily subjected itself
to action by OTS, the issue of whether it could include supervisory goodwill in
calculating regulatory capital was not moot. Id. Moreover, Carteret asserted
that, if it could include the goodwill, it could come into compliance more easily
because a bank in compliance with applicable capital requirements is more at-
tractive to outside investors. Id.
61. Carteret, 963 F.2d at 573-74.
62. Id. at 574.
63. Id. at 573-74. The court's assumption was based primarily on the fact
that neither party pressed the issue of whether the agreements could properly be
considered binding contracts. Id. OTS asserted that the Third Circuit did not
need to reach the issue of whether Carteret and the government entered into a
binding contract concerning the treatment of goodwill because FIRREA would
expressly override any such contract. Id. at 573. Similarly, Carteret did not con-
tend that its contracts could not be affected by subsequent legislative changes.
Id. Rather, Carteret contended that FIRREA did not abrogate the contracts. Id.
64. Id. at 574. The Third Circuit noted that the government's right to
change these capital requirements through a statute was derived from the gov-
ernment's sovereign power. Id. According to the court, "sovereign power 'is an
enduring presence that governs all contracts subject to the sovereign's jurisdic-
tion, and will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms.' " Id. (quoting
Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41,
52 (1986) and citing Western Fuels-Utah, Inc. v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 780, 789 (D.C.
Cir.) (holding that lease granting right to mine coal in federal land should not be
construed to reserve Congress' power to provide by law for specific readjust-
ment), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990)).
14
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the Bank Board.6 5 The parties disagreed as to whether FIRREA abro-
gated these contracts or whether Carteret could rely on the terms of the
contracts and use supervisory goodwill as part of its regulatory capital.
6 6
Before analyzing the statutory language of FIRREA, the Third Cir-
cuit examined the context in which Congress had enacted the statute.
6 7
The court first noted that the poor financial state of many thrift institu-
tions in the late 1980s had created a lack of consumer confidence in the
thrift industry.6 8 In addition, the court reviewed the basic goals behind
FIRREA's enactment: providing affordable mortgages to both low-in-
come and moderate-income individuals, resolving failed thrifts,
strengthening capital requirements for thrifts, providing stronger over-
sight to the thrifts and strengthening regulatory enforcement powers to
prevent fraud and insider abuse.
69
Against this backdrop, the court examined the statutory language of
FIRREA. 70 The court sought to determine whether the language of
65. Id. at 574.
66. Id. at 574-82.
67. Id. at 574-75.
68. Id. at 574. The court noted several sources for these difficulties. Id. at
575. Congress described various causes, highlighting "the poorly timed deregu-
lation; the dismal performance of some thrift managements; inadequate over-
sight, supervision and regulation by government regulatory agencies and the
Reagan Administration; a regional economic collapse; radical deregulation by
several large States; and outright fraud and insider abuse." Id. (quoting HousE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 294, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 90). In addition to
these emphasized causes, the court noted Congress' opinion that "accounting
gimmickry" intensified the problem. Id. (citing HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at
310-11, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 106-07). The court noted that what
Congress termed accounting gimmickry included treatment of supervisory
goodwill as regulatory capital. Id. (citing HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 310-11,
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 106-07). Treatment of supervisory goodwill as
regulatory capital was considered accounting gimmickry for the following rea-
son. Supervisory goodwill is an intangible asset. Id. By including supervisory
goodwill as regulatory capital, less of investors' own tangible assets were at stake.
Id.
69. Id. at 575. The court noted some of the basic changes FIRREA made in
an attempt to reach these goals. Id. While these changes included abolishing
the FSLIC and the Bank Board and replacing it with OTS, the court focused on
FIRREA's changes to capital requirements. Id. The court highlighted Congress'
discussion of the importance of the capital requirements:
[Sitrong capital standards are essential to protect the safety of our de-
posit insurance system. Capital represents the investment made by
owners of a savings association in that association. Without sufficient
capital, the owners have little incentive to limit the risks taken with de-
positors' funds. Therefore, an adequate capital requirement will pro-
vide the self-restraint necessary to limit risk-taking by Federally insured
savings associations.
Capital also protects the deposit insurance fund by providing a
cushion against losses if the institution's condition deteriorates.
Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 393, 404 (1989),
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 432, 443).
70. Id. at 575-78.
15
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FIRREA revealed any intent to abrogate pre-existing contracts, such as
those between Carteret and the Bank Board. 7 1 The Third Circuit first
discussed the general provisions of FIRREA relevant to the issues
presented on appeal. 72 The court found that FIRREA does contain pro-
visions requiring all savings institutions to maintain minimum capital re-
quirements. 7 3 Accordingly, the court stated that the Director of OTS
was correct in finding that institutions that failed to meet these require-
ments were unsound.74 Moreover, the court stated that the Director of
OTS possesses the power to direct unsound institutions to submit and
follow a plan to increase capital. 7 5 The Carteret court also discussed FIR-
REA's provisions governing required capital, particularly the provision
specifically excluding the use of supervisory goodwill in calculating reg-
ulatory capital.
76
The Third Circuit conceded that FIRREA did not explicitly prohibit
institutions with pre-existing contracts from using supervisory goodwill
in calculating capital requirements. 7 7 The court, nevertheless, found
support in the statute for the proposition that FIRREA prohibits such
use of supervisory goodwill. 78 The court accepted OTS's argument that
71. Id.
72. Id. at 575-76.
73. Id. at 575. The Third Circuit noted that FIRREA provides that "the
Director [of OTS] shall require all savings associations to achieve and maintain
adequate capital by-(A) establishing minimum levels of capital for savings as-
sociations; and (B) using such other methods as the Director determines to be
appropriate." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)(1) (Supp.
1991)).
74. Id. The Third Circuit noted that § 1464 of FIRREA also "permits the
Director to treat the failure of any savings association to maintain capital at or
above the minimum levels required as an 'unsafe or unsound practice.' " Id.
(quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)(3) (Supp. 1991)).
75. Id. at 575-76 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)(4) (Supp. 1991) (stating "the
director may issue a directive requiring any savings association which fails to
maintain capital at or above the minimum level required ... to submit and ad-
here to a plan for increasing capital")).
76. Id. at 576. FIRREA requires "uniformly applicable capital standards for
savings associations." 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(1) (Supp. 1991). In its capital re-
quirements, FIRREA requires a "savings association to maintain core capital in
an amount not less than 3 percent of the savings association's total assets and to
maintain tangible capital in an amount not less than 1.5 percent of the savings
association's total assets." Id. § 1464(t)(2)(A) & (B). FIRREA excludes intangi-
ble capital such as supervisory goodwill from its definition of tangible capital.
Id. § 1464(t)(9)(C). In tabular form, FIRREA gradually reduces the percentage
of supervisory goodwill that may be used in meeting core capital to zero. Id.
§ 1464(t)(3)(A).
77. Carteret, 963 F.2d at 576.
78. Id. In construing the statute, the court found evidence that Congress
intended to prohibit the use of supervisory goodwill in the definition of "qualify-
ing supervisory goodwill." Id. This definition states that the amortization pe-
riod allowable for supervisory goodwill is the shorter of 20 years or "the
remaining period for amortization in effect on April 12, 1989." Id.; 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(t)(9)(B) (Supp. 1991). The Third Circuit reasoned that "[t]here would
[Vol. 38: p. 12711286
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the statute's general attempt to establish uniformly applicable regula-
tion acutely diminished the use of supervisory goodwill. 79
The Third Circuit rejected Carteret's argument that the language in
FIRREA preserved contracts allowing the use of supervisory goodwill.8 0
Carteret based its argument on a savings clause provision in FIRREA. 8 l
This provision essentially preserved rights, arising under certain acts,
that existed before the date of the statute.8 2 Carteret contended that
the savings clause provision expressly preserved contract rights, not ab-
rogated them, and that Carteret's specific contract rights fell within this
provision. 83 Although the Third Circuit acknowledged that other dis-
trict court decisions supported Carteret's interpretation, the court found
these opinions unpersuasive.8 4 The Third Circuit determined that the
savings clause provision only applied to pre-existing agreements af-
fected by FIRREA's abolition of the FSLIC and the Bank Board.
8 5
Therefore, the court held that the savings provision did not apply to
agreements such as Carteret's that were affected by changes in capital
have been no reason to refer to the 'remaining period for amortization in effect'
if the new provisions were inapplicable to previously accepted supervisory good-
will." Carteret, 963 F.2d at 576.
79. Carteret, 963 F.2d at 576. OTS reasoned that by imposing uniform reg-
ulations in FIRREA, Congress intended "to abrogate any pre-existing agree-
ments between the former regulators and savings institutions authorizing
greater use of supervisory goodwill as regulatory capital." Id.
80. Id. at 576-78.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 576. The relevant savings clause provision in FIRREA provides:
(g) Savings Provisions Relating to FHLBB-
(1) Existing Rights, Duties, and Obligations Not Affected - Sub-
section (a) [which abolishes the FHLBB and FSLIC] shall not affect the
validity of any right, duty, or obligation of the United States, the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board, or any other person, which-
(A) arises under or pursuant to the Federal Home Loan Bank
Act, the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, or any other provision of law
applicable with respect to such Board (other than title IV of the Na-
tional Housing Act); and
(B) existed on the day before the date of the enactment of this
Act.
12 U.S.C. § 4 01(g); see also 12 U.S.C. § 401(f) (similar provision regarding
FSLIC instead of Bank Board).
83. Carteret, 963 F.2d at 577. In its brief, Carteret maintained that its "bar-
gained-for contract rights to include supervisory goodwill in regulatory capital
(and [the Bank Board's] corollary obligation) fit squarely within 'any' right or
obligation arising under [the act]." Id. (quoting Brief of Appellee, supra note 15,
at 32).
84. Id. (citing Security Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision,
761 F. Supp. 1277, 1284 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (holding OTS bound to forbearance
agreements and enjoining OTS from excluding supervisory goodwill in calculat-
ing regulatory capital), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 960 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir.
1992), and Hansen Savings Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 758 F. Supp.
240, 246 (D.N.J. 1991) (same)).
85. Id.
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requirements.8 6 In rejecting Carteret's argument, the Third Circuit re-
lied on recent decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits that had also addressed the issue and
had rejected the savings clause provision argument. 8 7
Because the Third Circuit found the statutory language persuasive,
rather than conclusive on the issue, the court analyzed the legislative
history of FIRREA in order to determine the congressional intent.8 8 In
discerning the legislative intent, the Third Circuit disagreed with the
district court's findings. 8 9 The Third Circuit concluded from its review
of the legislative history that Congress had intended to exclude intangi-
ble assets, such as supervisory goodwill, from capital. 90 The Third Cir-
cuit noted that several Congressmen dissented from the portion of
FIRREA that phased out the use of supervisory goodwill. 91 Drawing
from these dissents, the court concluded that these Congressmen them-
selves believed that FIRREA abrogated capital forbearance
86. Id. The court held that "by its terms, section 401(g) only saves those
contracts that would be abolished as a result of the elimination of the Bank
Board and the FSLIC." Id.
87. Id. at 577-78 (citing and discussing: Guaranty Financial Service, Inc. v.
Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 928 F.2d 994, 1003 (11 th Cir. 1991) (not-
ing that "the possible loss of [the thrift's] supervisory goodwill forbearance is
the result not of the abolition of the agencies, but of the new capital standards,
and that a savings provision ... is inapplicable to [the thrift's] situation"); Frank-
lin Federal Savings Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 927 F.2d
1332, 1339 (6th Cir.) (noting that savings provision "is intended to assure that
the OTS remained in privity with the FSLIC and the FHLBB, not to exempt
banks with forbearance agreements from the substantive provisions of FIR-
REA"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 370 (1991); and Far West Federal Bank v. Director,
Office of Thrift Supervision, 951 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1991) (relying on
rationale in Guaranty Fin. Sers. and Franklin Fed. Say. Bank)).
88. Id. at 578-82.
89. Id. at 579.
90. Id. The Third Circuit noted a "clear congressional intent to remedy
promptly the problem of inadequate capitalization of thrifts caused by the use of
intangible assets (such as supervisory goodwill) as regulatory capital." Id. The
court found this Congressional intent in the House Report accompanying
FIRREA:
To a considerable extent, the size of the thrift crisis resulted from the
utilization of capital gimmicks that masked the inadequate capitaliza-
tion of thrifts. It is the shared belief of the Committee and the Admin-
istration that if a crisis of this nature is to be prevented from happening again,
thrifts must be adequately capitalized against losses.
The legislation seeks to provide this protection by establishing a
core capital requirement [that] . . . takes effect on June 1, 1990. Begin-
ning then, certain qualifying intangibles can be included on a declining
basis until, by January 1, 1995, the [core capital requirement] must be
met without any qualifying intangibles.
Id. (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 310-11, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 106-07). The court hypothesized that the threat of "massive
failures" would continue as long as the government allowed thrifts to capitalize
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agreements.
9 2
By examining a congressional debate on a proposed amendment
dealing with abrogation of pre-existing forbearance contracts, the Third
Circuit found additional, and even more compelling, support for OTS's
interpretation of FIRREA. 93 The court first acknowledged that the
amendment did not "squarely present" the issue of congressional intent
to abrogate forbearance agreements. 94 The court then stated that the
debates concerning the amendment did indicate that the Congressmen
understood that FIRREA would invalidate agreements allowing use of
supervisory goodwill as capital. 95 In addition, the court reasoned that if
Congress intended the savings clause provision to preserve the forbear-
92. Id. The court stated that "[i]f [these] members, those most intimately
familiar with the proposed statute, did not believe that FIRREA would abrogate
the earlier capital forbearance agreements, there would have been no need for a
dissent grounded on precisely that basis." Id. The dissenters wrote in the
House report that "[s]imply put, the Committee has reneged on the agreements
that the government entered into concerning supervisory goodwill.... Clearly,
the agreements concerning the treatment of goodwill were part of what the insti-
tutions had bargained for. Just as clearly, the Committee is abrogating those
agreements." Id. (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 498, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 293-94).
93. Id. at 579-80. Although Congressman Quillen originally proposed an
amendment that would "grandfather" all savings and loan institutions that had
entered into forbearance agreements, he withdrew his proposal when Represen-
tative Hyde proposed another, more complex amendment. Id. at 579; CONGRES-
SIONAL RECORD, supra note 19, at H2701 (statement of Rep. Quillen).
Congressman Hyde summarized his amendment as follows:
My proposal is that the banking regulators ... should consider the spe-
cial claims of this limited class of thrifts through the forum of a due
process administrative hearing. This hearing would take place before
any enforcement action is taken. Only those institutions that would
meet the new capital standards requirements but for the statutory
change in the treatment of their supervisory goodwill would be eligible
to plead their case.
... The "appropriate federal banking agencies" would have the
discretion to determine whether or not a particular thrift had a valid,
pre-existing contract with the United States with regard to the on-going
treatment of their supervisory goodwill ... [and] whether or not these
savings associations have a potential claim under the Constitution.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 27, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 410. Con-
gressman Hyde also referred to the situation as "Congress ... telling these same
thrifts that they cannot count this goodwill toward meeting the new capital stan-
dards." Id. Congress debated and ultimately voted against the Hyde Agree-
ment. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, supra note 19, at H2703-18.
94. Carteret, 963 F.2d at 580.
95. Id. The Third Circuit first noted Representative Price's statement that
"[t]he proponents of the amendment say a 'Deal is a Deal' and wear buttons
proclaiming this sentiment. But to claim that Congress can never change a regu-
latory's decision ... in the future is simply not tenable." Id (quoting CONGRES-
SIONAL RECORD, supra note 19, at H2710 (statement of Rep. Price) (alteration
added)). The court next noted Representative Annunzio's statement that "[ilt is
ironic that Congress ... wants to undo the supervisory goodwill approvals [be-
cause] [i]t makes no sense . . .that Congress would . . .overturn those agree-
ments in which others volunteered to take the losses. Yet that is what [the bill]
19
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ance agreements, Congress would have expressly indicated such an in-
tent during these debates and discussions.9 6 Relying on this rationale,
the court concluded that the savings provision was not "the magical
elixir" that would allow financial institutions like Carteret to rely on
their forbearance agreements from the government.9 7 In reaching such
does." Id. (quoting CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, supra note 19, at H2710 (statement
of Rep. Annunzio)).
96. Id. Because Carteret did not present any evidence in the legislative his-
tory regarding § 4 01(g) to rebut OTS's strong argument, the court accepted
OTS's interpretation of the legislative history of FIRREA. Id.
97. Id. In concluding that the savings provision did not allow a financial
institution to rely on its pre-existing forbearance agreements, the Third Circuit
rejected each of Carteret's arguments concerning the legislative history of FIR-
REA. Id. at 580-81. In asserting that the savings clause preserved forbearance
agreements, Carteret relied on a section of FIRREA pertaining to the Resolution
Trust Corporation (RTC) and not OTS. Id. at 581; see 12 U.S.C. § 144 1a(b)(3)
(Supp. 1991) (describing RTC as agency managing and resolving cases of insti-
tutions placed in conservatorship or receivership). Section 1441a(b)(3) autho-
rizes RTC to "review and analyze assistance agreements related to insolvent
institution cases." Carteret, 963 F.2d at 581; see 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(10)(C)(i)
(authorizing RTC "to modify, renegotiate, or restructure agreements ... where
savings would be realized by such actions" but not authorizing RTC "to modify,
renegotiate, or restructure agreements between the [FSLIC] and any other party
which did not exist prior to [a certain date]"); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at
444, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 240 (restructure of resolution agreement
only as "permitted by the terms of the agreement"). The Third Circuit recog-
nized that this section of the statute had nothing to do with FIRREA's capital
standards for thrifts. Carteret, 963 F.2d at 581.
The court also rejected Carteret's statutory construction argument that
when Congress terminates pre-existing contract rights, it does so in "clear and
unmistakable terms." Id. (noting Carteret's citing of Feres v. United States, 340
U.S. 135, 146 (1950), which decided application of Federal Tort Claims Act to
servicemen's injuries sustained during service). The court reasoned that such a
standard was not appropriate in this action because the government regulates
the banking industry so heavily and the rules change frequently. Id.
Carteret next relied on Chester County Intermediate Unit v. Pennsylvania
Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1990). Chester County presented the issue of
whether insurance companies could exclude from coverage any amounts pro-
vided to individuals free of charge under a federal act. Id. The Chester County
court found that it could not "conclude, without clear statutory support, that
Congress intended [the act] to abrogate such a provision in a privately negoti-
ated contract ... [and] that Congress would not have done so without explicitly
so providing." Id. at 815. The Third Circuit pointed out that its holding in
Chester County was specifically limited to private contracts. Carteret, 963 F.2d at
581.
The Third Circuit also rejected Carteret's argument that OTS's interpreta-
tion of FIRREA was entitled to no deference. Id. at 582. In arguing that the
court should not defer to OTS's interpretation, Carteret first cited a recent
Supreme Court opinion. Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395
(1991)). The Third Circuit found this case inapposite, however, because the
Court "neither deferred to nor even discussed the [agency's] interpretation" on
the subject. Id. The Third Circuit noted that the Supreme Court's opinion was
based on Congressional intent and not deference to the agency's interpretation.
Id. Finally, the Third Circuit rejected Carteret's argument that the court should
not defer to OTS's interpretation because OTS was a party to the forbearance
1290 [Vol. 38: p. 1271
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a conclusion, the Third Circuit joined the Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits in finding that the legislative history supported the premise that
Congress, under FIRREA, intended to abrogate pre-existing contracts
allowing the use of supervisory goodwill as capital. 98
2. Fifth Amendment Takings Claims
The final issue that the Third Circuit considered on appeal was Car-
teret's Fifth Amendment takings claim.9 9 Carteret argued that by abro-
gating Carteret's contractual right to utilize supervisory goodwill as
regulatory capital, the government was taking Carteret's property with-
out just compensation.10 0 The Third Circuit accepted OTS's jurisdic-
tional challenge to this claim.' 0 1 In concluding that an injunction issued
by the Third Circuit was not an appropriate remedy, the court stated
that Carteret must seek a damage award in the United States Claims
Court.
0 2
The court reasoned that the taking of property is only unconstitu-
tional when the government fails to award just compensation. 10 3 The
agreements. Id. In rejecting this argument, the court stated that Carteret's con-
tention presumed bias by OTS and no evidence of bias existed in the record. Id.
The court found no evidence of bias because OTS announced its interpretation
prior to Carteret bringing its case to trial. Id.
98. Id. at 578-79. Each of the three circuit courts deciding the issue found
the same arguments persuasive. Id. In analyzing the legislative history of FIR-
REA, the Eleventh Circuit found several sources of support for the proposition
that Congress, in enacting FIRREA, intended to abrogate supervisory goodwill
agreements. Guaranty Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision,
928 F.2d 994, 1004-06 (11 th Cir. 1991). The Guaranty court found that those
Congressmen supporting and those opposing treatment of supervisory goodwill
in this manner believed FIRREA would abrogate these contracts. Id. at 1004-05.
Although the Guaranty court did not support Congress' reasoning in rejecting
the Hyde Amendment, the court found the debates surrounding the amendment
persuasive. Id. at 1005-06. The Guaranty court concluded that "the statements
[found in the legislative history] give an 'accurate picture of the congressional
understanding that FIRREA would abrogate supervisory goodwill forbearances
... [and the court did not find] a single reference to section 40 1 (g) . . . in any of
the congressional discussions of the treatment of supervisory goodwill." Id. at
1106. In Franklin Federal Savings Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, the
Sixth Circuit similarly found these portions of the legislative history persuasive
on the issue of FIRREA's abrogation of forbearance agreements. 927 F.2d
1332, 1339-41 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 370 (1991). In deciding a similar
case, the Ninth Circuit incorporated by reference the Sixth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits' analyses of FIRREA's legislative history. See Far W. Fed. Bank v. Director,
Office of Thrift Supervision, 951 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1991).
99. Carteret, 963 F.2d at 582-84.
100. Id. at 582.
101. Id. at 582-83.
102. Id. at 584.
103. Id. at 583; see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (stating that Fifth Amendment does not
"limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather ...
secure[s] compensation in the event of an otherwise proper interference amount-
21
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court recognized that while it would be difficult to measure compensa-
tion for Carteret's injury, such compensation was the only relief to which
Carteret was entitled.'
0 4
ing to a taking"). In affording the challenging party process under the Tucker
Act, a claims court must first determine whether the damages awarded under
that statute would rise to the level of just compensation. Carteret, 963 F.2d at
583-84. The Third Circuit stated that if the party seeking compensation from
the government in a takings claim may bring suit, a court should not entertain a
suit for equitable relief. Id. at 583; see United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127-28 (1985) (discussing takings issue in context of
environmental statute requiring permits for use of wetlands); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (discussing takings issue in context of
government agency requiring submission and disclosure of data for permitting).
The Third Circuit further explained that takings claims are premature until a
party exhausts remedies under the Tucker Act. Carteret, 963 F.2d at 583; see
Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990) (deciding
whether statute allowing government agency to preserve abandoned railway
rights-of-way for future rail use constituted taking); Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194-95 (1986) (deciding
whether subsequent zoning density requirements constituted taking); Monsanto,
467 U.S. at 1018 n.21 (noting that "[t]o the extent that the operation of the
statute provides compensation, no taking has occurred and the original submit-
ter of data has no claim against the government").
104. Carteret, 963 F.2d at 583-84. Carteret claimed that because its injury
meant that OTS would be able to "issue directives severely interfering with Car-
teret's ability to acquire new assets and liabilities, it [would] be impossible to
obtain relief under the Tucker Act rising to the constitutionally required level of
'just compensation.' " Id. at 583. The Third Circuit noted that a district court
recently considered and rejected this type of argument. Id. (citing Northeast
Savings, FA v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 770 F. Supp. 19, 23-25
(D.D.C. 1991) (stating that source of rights claimed by plaintiff is alleged con-
tract between plaintiff and government and that plaintiff could only get damages
but not specific performance)). In addition, the Third Circuit found support in
other federal cases for its conclusion on this matter. Id. at 584 (citing Regional
Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 155-56 (1974) (assuring that
Tucker Act remedy is applicable if there was taking) and Franklin Federal Sav-
ings Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 927 F.2d 1332, 1341 (6th
Cir. 1990) (noting that "[i]n the event [that this action was] determined to be
taking, [the thrift] would be entitled to compensation, not to equitable relief"),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 370 (1991)).
Carteret cited several cases to support the proposition that a court may en-
join a taking when monetary damages are inadequate. Id. at 584. The cotirt
stated that these cases were inapposite. Id. The court stated that the Tucker Act
did not apply to the cases cited by Carteret, and therefore an injunction was the
appropriate remedy in those cases, according to the Third Circuit. Id. (citing
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1951) (takings not
affected by statutory authority so Tucker Act does not apply); Ramirez de Arel-
lano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1522-23 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (same),
vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); and Regional Rail Reorganization
Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 127 n.16 (1974) (officer's act of taking not act of govern-
ment so Tucker Act does not apply)). The Third Circuit did not find Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978),
relevant to the issue because the plaintiffs in that case were not requesting in-
junctive relief. Carteret, 963 F.2d at 584.
f292
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit based its analysis in Carteret on sound legal princi-
ples and reasoning. First, no provision in the statute expressly or im-
pliedly preserves forbearance agreements allowing thrifts to use
supervisory goodwill in meeting regulatory capital requirements. 10 5 In
addition, the legislative history supports the Third Circuit's finding that
Congress intended courts to construe the statute to abolish forbearance
agreements.' 0 6 The Third Circuit's decision is further supported by
opinions of several circuit courts that addressed the issue both prior to
CarteretI0 7 and after Carteret, reaching the same conclusion as the Third
Circuit.' 0 8 Finally, the fact that the United States Supreme Court has
denied certification on this issue further supports the notion that the
conclusions these courts have reached are sound because it implies that
the Court agrees with the way in which the cases have been decided. 10 9
Although the Third Circuit's opinion is legally sound, its mandate
produces several unfortunate results. FIRREA's treatment of supervi-
sory goodwill, as construed by the Third Circuit, forces many thrifts out
of compliance with FIRREA's regulatory capital requirements." 0 Be-
105. For a discussion of the Carteret court's analysis of the statutory lan-
guage of FIRREA, see supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
106. For a discussion of the legislative history of FIRREA, see supra notes
88-97 and accompanying text.
107. For a discussion of the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit opinions
addressing this issue, see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
108. See Transohio Say. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967
F.2d 598, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that FIRREA's new capital require-
ments applied to all thrifts, including those that had forbearance agreements,
and rejecting thrift's constitutional takings claim); Security Sav. and Loan v. Di-
rector, Office of Thrift Supervision, 960 F.2d 1318, 1322 (5th Cir. 1992) (same);
accord Charter Fed. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 976 F.2d 203, 213
(4th Cir. 1992) (holding that Bank Board "did not contract to exempt [thrift]
from FIRREA's capital regulatory requirements ... [but] agreed only to permit
such use of supervisory goodwill as was lawful under the regulations").
109. See Franklin Fed. Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision,
976 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 370 (1991) (Supreme Court
denying certification to decide issue of whether FIRREA abrogated contractual
forbearances allowing use of supervisory goodwill in calculating regulatory capi-
tal). The Supreme Court probably will not decide the issue unless another cir-
cuit court, addressing the issue for the first time, holds that FIRREA does not
abolish forbearance agreements allowing use of supervisory goodwill as part of
required capital. See Stephen Kleege, High Court Lets Stand Curb on S&L Goodwill,
THE AM. BANKER, Nov. 5, 1991, at 1 (noting that lawyers who argued Franklin
Federal case stated that "[sihould another federal appeals court reach a contrary
ruling, the Supreme Court might have to resolve the conflict").
110. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 26, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
410 ("Estimates [at the time FIRREA was enacted were] that [when] the new
capital standards [went] into effect ... at least 152 savings associations [would]
automatically become insolvent on paper."). Even though the estimated figures
were high to begin with, as the stricter capital provisions of FIRREA took effect,
even greater number of thrifts fell short of the capital standards. See Debra
Cope, 241 More S&L's Short of Capital Under '91 Rules, THE AM. BANKER, Jan. 9,
23
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cause a thrift in non-compliance must conform to certain minimum pro-
cedures outlined in FIRREA, OTS essentially dictates the thrift's
operations.Il' This control includes the power to significantly limit the
transactions a thrift may undertake respecting asset growth and to ap-
point a conservator or receiver.' 12 Under FIRREA's mandate, many
thrifts could conceivably fail-the exact result Congress intended to pre-
vent by enacting FIRREA." 1 3 Moreover, the financial burden of resolv-
1991, at 1 (noting thatJohn Downey, OTS deputy director for regional opera-
tions, predicted that "some 241 thrifts are expected to fall short of the 1991
standards and ... [t]hat is on top of the 276 capital deficient thrifts operating
under [capital] plans at the end of November 1990").
Many thrifts such as Carteret, whose capital base met regulatory standards
through the use of supervisory goodwill prior to FIRREA, were forced out of
compliance the day FIRREA took effect. See Robert M. Garsson, S&L Law: 'A 'for
Effort, 'C'for Execution, THE AM. BANKER, Aug. 2, 1991, at 1 (recognizing that
"[m]any profitable thrifts have suffered unnecessarily"); Capital Requirements for
Thrifts as they Apply to Supervisory Goodwill: Hearing before the Subcomm. on General
Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 102nd
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1991) [hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of Rep. John
LaFlace) (stating that fear that Congress would "maximize the number of thrift
institutions which would be deemed insolvent, catching even viable institutions
within the net" was realized).
111. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(6) (Supp. 1991) (detailing consequences of
failure to comply with capital standards); see also Cope, supra note 110, at 1 (not-
ing that in order "[t]o win regulators' permission to operate with low capital, a
thrift must spell out and defend strategies for raising additional funds").
112. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)(4) (Supp. 1991) (stating that Director of OTS
"may issue a directive requiring any savings association which fails to maintain
capital at or above the minimum level . . .to submit and adhere to a plan for
increasing capital which is acceptable to the Director"); see id. § 1464(t)(6)(A)
(requiring plan that "addresses [thrift's] need for increased capital, . . . describes
the manner in which the [thrift] will increase its capital .... specifies the types
and levels of activities in which the [thrift] will engage ...[and] requires in-
crease in assets to be accompanied by an increase in tangible capital"); see also
Brief for Appellee, supra note 15, at 47 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 567.10(b)(2) & (b)(l)
(1991) and 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(6)(A) & (B) and stating that "[i]f a thrift fails a
capital requirement, OTS must impose a capital directive and must prohibit asset
growth"); House Hearing, supra note 110, at 33 (statement of Timothy Ryan, Di-
rector of OTS) ("The capital plan process ... provides OTS with the flexibility
to allow undercapitalized, but economically viable institutions to remain open
while operating under an approved capital plan.").
Although 241 capital plans of undercapitalized thrifts were approved, 281
were not approved. Cope, supra note 110, at 1. Even if a thrift's plan is ap-
proved, the thrift may not survive because only approximately 75% of thrifts
with approved plans survive. Id. If a capital plan is not accepted by OTS, the
thrift is frozen, "unable to lend or invest funds." Id.
If a thrift is undercapitalized, OTS also has the power to appoint a conserva-
tor or receiver. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A) (for federal savings associations)
& § 1464(d)(2)(C) (for state savings associations); see alsoJordan Luke, The Impact
of FIRREA on the Thrift Industry, 171 ALI-ABA RESOURCE MATERIALS, BANKING
AND COMMERCIAL LENDING LAws 495, 495 (1990) (discussing effects of FIRREA
on thrift industry and examining resulting trends).
113. See Garsson, supra note 110, at 1. A thrift lobbyist, who was at first
enthusiastic about FIRREA, two years later believed "the bill set us off on a
course debilitating to the thrift industry." Id. Many thrift and bank executives,
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ing or selling such a failed thrift ultimately falls on the government and
the taxpayers." 1
4
Carteret illustrates the difficulties in trying to strengthen capital re-
quirements for the thrift industry without forcing some of the industry's
constituents into non-compliance. At the time Congress enacted FIR-
REA, some Congressmen offered alternative solutions to the thrift crisis,
which were not adopted." 15 Presently, a thrift's only option is applying
to OTS for an exemption. 1 6 This alternative, however, does not pro-
analysts, and consultants share this belief. Id. The Director of OTS claims, how-
ever, that "the agency will not shut down profitable thrifts, but will allow inves-
tors to replace the goodwill with other assets.". Kleege, supra note 119, at 1.
The Director did not discuss, however, whether investors in this economy are
willing to invest in an undercapitalized thrift. Id.
114. See Garsson, supra note 110, at 1 (noting that some Congressmen be-
lieve FIRREA is "a deeply flawed piece of legislation" and that "the largest defi-
cit in history . . . [was] caused by the S&L and banking industries"); House
Hearing, supra note 110, at 7 (statement of Rep. LaFlace) (noting that "[t]hrifts
with weakened capital position, but clear franchise value, are nevertheless being
closed rather than assisted" and "[t]he cost of the thrift bailout is now more than
double the original estimate and is still rising").
115. See CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, supra note 19, at H2700-03 (describing
some potential solutions); see also House Hearing, supra note 110. Several Con-
gressmen have suggested allowing thrifts time to use supervisory goodwill as
capital while the thrifts build their capital base with tangible assets. House Hear-
ing, supra note 110. These Congressmen have advanced two reasons why an ex-
tension of time would aid the thrifts. Id. at 3. First, the current recession makes
it more difficult for thrifts to raise capital. Id. Second, it is "very, very difficult
for institutions . . . haunted by the regulations imposed by FIRREA to become
viable institutions by going out into the marketplace to raise that capital." Id.;
One congressman noted that "[w]e could minimize the taxpayer cost and the
disruption to our economy if we only gave these institutions some more time to
adjust to a very dramatic change." Id. at 7. Several commentators have also
supported this solution. See, e.g., Cope, supra note 110, at 1 (noting that institu-
tions would be able to build capital by "augmentation of earnings or contraction
of the balance sheet .... changing [the] portfolio mix to reduce the risk-based
capital requirement .... [and] cut[ting] overhead, starting with the payroll" and
further noting that OTS's deputy director for regional operations stated that
"[OTS] is considering whether to give thrifts extra time to achieve their goals"
in light of the "turbulent economic times"); Garsson, supra note 110, at 1 (quot-
ing Representative Hoagland stating that "[i]f we had known then that the econ-
omy was going to have the difficulties it has had, and that the price tag (for the
law's reforms) would be so high, I think we would have tried to give the S&Ls
more time to adjust").
116. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(7)(A) (Supp. 1991). If a thrift does not meet the
capital requirements, it may request an exemption from OTS. Id. The director
of OTS will approve a request for exemption if he or she determines that
(I) such exemption will pose no significant risk to the affected de-
posit insurance fund;
(II) the savings association's management is competent;
(III) the savings association is in substantial compliance with all
applicable statues, regulations, orders, and supervisory agreements and
directives; and
(IV) the savings association's management has not engaged in in-
sider dealing, speculative practices, or any other activities that have
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vide an acceptable remedy to an industry that relied on the govern-
ment's promises, only to find itself penalized by the government for that
reliance. 117
Alison M. Bennett
jeopardized the association's safety and soundness or contributed to
impairing the association's capital.
Id. § 1464(t)(7)(C)(i). Previously, a thrift that did not meet capital requirements
could alternatively request an exception if the thrift was "eligible" within the
meaning of the statute. Id. at § 1464(t)(8) (no longer applicable afterJanuary 1,
1991).
Since the Third Circuit decided Carteret, the United States Claims Court has
addressed similar issues to those presented in Carteret. See Statesman Sav. Hold-
ing Corp. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 904 (Cl. Ct. 1992), vacated sub nom. Winstar
Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Statesman involved the
claims of two thrifts, Statesman Savings Holding Corp. and Glendale Federal
Bank, FSB. Id. at 906. The Claims Court found that a binding contract existed
between each thrift and the government, requiring the Bank Board "to forbear
from exercising its authority to bring enforcement proceedings against [the
thrifts] for failure to meet regulatory capital standards." Id. at 911-13. The
Claims Court held that the government could not abrogate these contracts
under FIRREA without liability to the thrifts for breach of contract. Id. at 913-
15. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit re-
versed the Claims Court's decision in Statesman. Winstar Corp. v. United States,
994 F.2d 797 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The Federal Circuit held that the thrifts "had no
contract right to have the goodwill generated by their acquisition(s) treated as
regulatory capital." Id. at 813. Therefore, what at one time seemed to be an
avenue for relief to a thrift has now been closed.
117. See CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, supra note 19, at H2703 (statement of
Rep. Hyde). During the debate on the proposed Hyde Amendment, Congress-
man Hyde discussed the inherent unfairness of the thrifts' situation. Id. He
noted that the effected institutions were not the "bad guys," "high fliers," or
"fast buck artists that exploited the deposit insurance to make risky invest-
ments." Id. Representative Hyde concluded that the thrifts' only mistake "was
trusting the bank regulators and accepting their word that they could count this
accounting procedure, this supervisory goodwill, for up to 40 years, and in reli-
ance on the word of their Government they merged and they tried to make via-
ble and profitable and solvent the sick institutions." Id. at H2703-04.
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